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CIVIL PROCEDURE-PERSONAL JURISDICTION: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT
INTERPRETATION OF THE STREAM OF COMMERCE TEST IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1900s, United States courts have increasingly exercised
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.' In the 1960s, both
federal and state courts began to assert personal jurisdiction over non-
resident manufacturers who purposefully placed injury-causing products
into the "stream of commerce." 2 In the 1980s, the United States Supreme
1. See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (upholding New Jersey law
requiring nonresident motorists to file consent form with Secretary of State of New
Jersey appointing that official as their agent for service of process if legal proceed-
ings arise from motor vehicle accident within state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927) (expanding Kane by upholding Massachusetts law which declared that non-
resident motorists, by driving on state roads, had consented to appointment of
state official as their agent for service of process in motor vehicle accident cases);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (exercisingjurisdiction
over out-of-state corporate defendant on basis of presence within forum state in-
stead of consent to suit); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950) (concluding that trust company had jurisdiction over out-of-state bene-
ficiaries in proceeding to settle accounts); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950) (concluding that Virginia's State Corporation Commission had
jurisdiction in enforcement proceeding over out-of-state corporation that provided
health insurance by mail to Virginia residents); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (concluding that no violation of due process would occur
for Ohio courts to exercise jurisdiction over Philippine mining corporation that
relocated its headquarters to Ohio during Japanese occupation of Philippines);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (allowing California state
court to exercise jurisdiction over Texas life insurance company because company
sold life insurance policies to California citizens); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (exercising personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) (2) (A) when defend-
ants failed to comply with discovery orders relating to personal jurisdiction); Kee-
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (exercising jurisdiction over
defendant even though plaintiff admitted to forum-shopping); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (allowing national franchisor headquartered in
Florida to sue Michigan-based franchisee in Florida where alleged injury arose out
of or related to actions of defendant that were directed toward forum state); see also
Bradley W. Paulson, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Aliens: Unraveling Entan-
gled Case Law, 13 Hous.J. INT'L L. 117, 118 (1990-91) (recognizing that power of
United States courts to assert jurisdiction over alien defendants has increased over
last century).
2. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761
(I1. 1961) (establishing stream of commerce analysis); see also Coulter v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying stream of com-
merce analysis); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1969)
(same); Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D.
Minn. 1969) (same); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 648
(N.D. 111. 1965) (same); International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 459
(779)
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Court approvingly cited the "stream of commerce" analysis in deciding
three personal jurisdiction cases.3 Unfortunately, these Supreme Court
decisions have failed to clarify the scope of the stream of commerce analy-
sis. 4 Without proper guidance from the Supreme Court, lower state and
federal courts have applied different stream of commerce analyses in exer-
cising personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. 5
S.W.2d 62, 64-65 (Ark. 1970) (same); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 458
P.2d 57, 64 (Cal. 1969) (same); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of Am., 454 P.2d 63,
68 (Idaho 1969) (same); Andersen v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639,
643 (Iowa 1965) (same); Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ill. 1979)
(same); Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 124 N.W.2d 824,
827 (Minn. 1963) (same); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court. 415 P.2d
617, 619 (Nev. 1966) (same); Winston Indus., Inc. v. Seventh Judicial District
Court, 560 P.2d 572, 574 (Okla. 1977) (same); Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 504
P.2d 782, 785 (Wash. 1972) (same). But see Chunky Corp. v. Blumenthal Bros.
Chocolate Co., 299 F. Supp. 110, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (rejecting stream of com-
merce analysis and requiring more substantial source of conduct to justify exercise
of in personamjurisdiction over foreign corporation); Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 150
S.E.2d 793, 801-02 (W. Va. 1966) (holding that foreign corporation did not have
minimum contacts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon courts of forum state).
3. SeeAsahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (refusing to
exercise personal jurisdiction over alien defendant in indemnification action be-
tween two alien corporations); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985) (allowing national franchisor headquartered in Florida to sue Michigan-
based franchisee in Florida federal district court); World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (concluding that Oklahoma state courts could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over New York automobile distributor in products
liability action).
4. Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A
Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 Ky. LJ. 243, 270 (1988-89) (noting that
World-Wide Volkswagen did little to resolve confusion regarding stream of commerce
theory); Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up the
Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FiA. ST. U. L. REv. 105, 105 (1991) (noting
that Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction have failed to clarify per-
sonal jurisdiction); see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102 (issuing three sharply divided opin-
ions describing appropriate analysis for stream of commerce cases).
5. Compare Renner v. Lanard Toys, 33 F.3d 277 (3rd Cir. 1994) (avoiding
stream of commerce issue by remanding case for further discovery to determine
whether court had jurisdiction); Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21
F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (avoiding stream of commerce debate by exercis-
ing jurisdiction under all three Asahi tests); Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods.,
993 F.2d 528, 543 (6th Cir.) (stating that facts supported personal jurisdiction even
under purposeful availment test), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Vermeulen v.
Renault, U.S.A., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993) (avoiding application of
stream of commerce test by holding higher standard was met); Shute v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 499
U.S. 585 (1991) with Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d
610, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting Justice Brennan's Asahi view); Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Boit v..
Gar-Tec Prods., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (adopting Justice O'Connor's
Asahi view); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992)
(adoptingJustice Brennan's Asahi view). For a further discussion of Asahi, see infra
notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
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CASEBRIEF
This Casebrief discusses the stream of commerce analysis for exercis-
ing personal jurisdiction as interpreted by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. First, Part II describes the evolution of
personal jurisdiction from the territorial principles of Pennoyer v. Neff,6
through the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,7
to the stream of commerce theory of Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court.
8
Then, Part III discusses how other circuits have interpreted the stream of
commerce analysis. 9 Next, Part IV of this Casebrief discusses the Third
Circuit's approach to applying the stream of commerce analysis to non-
resident manufacturers. 10 Finally, Parts V and VI summarize and provide
clear guidelines for lawyers dealing with personal jurisdiction issues in the
Third Circuit.1
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE SUPREME COURT
Over the past 125 years, legal and economic changes in American
society have altered personal jurisdiction in American courts. 12 The
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer limited personal jurisdiction to situations
where a forum state could assert sovereignty over a defendant or his or her prop-
erty. Id. at 722. For a further discussion of Pennoyer, see infra notes 14-25 and
accompanying text.
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that courts have historically required a defendant's presence
within a court's territorial jurisdiction as a prerequisite to exercising personal juris-
diction. Id. at 316. However, the Court reasoned that because personal service of
process or other forms of notice are available to notify a defendant of legal pro-
ceedings, due process would not be offended by expanding the notion of corpo-
rate -presence in terms of minimum contacts. Id. The Court concluded that a
forum state could exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if
the defendant had certain minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. For a fur-
ther discussion of International Shoe, see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
8. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi, the Supreme Court refused to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over an alien defendant in an indemnification action involving
two alien corporations. Id. at 108. For a further discussion of Asahi, see infra notes
59-79 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of how courts have interpreted Asahi and the
stream of commerce analysis, see infra notes 80-130 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the stream of
commerce analysis, see infra notes 96-130 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's guidelines to stream of
commerce analysis, see infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
12. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee,
the Supreme Court recognized that many commercial transactions involve more
than one state. Id. at 222-23. The Court stated:
With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great in-
crease in the amount of business conducted... across state lines. At the
same time modem transportation and communication have made it
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 223. Twenty-three years later, in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980), the Supreme Court noted that the expansion in personal jurisdic-
tion "is largely attributable to a fundamental transformation in the American econ-
omy." Id. at 292-93 (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23). The Supreme Court further
19951
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stream of commerce theory provides an example of how American courts
adapted personal jurisdiction to reflect a growing interstate and interna-
tional economy.13 The evolution of personal jurisdiction over the last cen-
tury began with Pennoyer v. Neff14
In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court declined to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident defendant who was not served with process in the
forum state. 15 The Court set forth two "well-established principles" of
public law that defined the scope of a court's jurisdiction: (1) "every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory;" and (2) "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
noted that the historical developments described in McGee have only accelerated in
the past 23 years. Id. at 293.
13. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th
Cir. 1994). Because of NAFTA and GATT, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit noted that "one can expect further globalization of commerce"
and that there has been an "acceleration in the internationalization of commerce."
Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that it is only reasonable for companies that
distribute defective products in this country "to anticipate being haled into court
by plaintiffs in their home state." Id.; see Murphy, supra note 4, at 253 (comment-
ing that courts introduced flexibility into personal jurisdiction standard to bridge
gap between commercial economic reality and law).
14. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Prior to the growth of interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court adhered to a strict territorial basis for asserting personal jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 567 (1906) (stating that per-
sonal judgment rendered upon constructive service is void against non-resident);
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1895) (holding that judgment ren-
dered in one state court is invalid in another state's courts unless service of process
was made upon defendant within forum state); Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 155
(1884) (concluding that personal jurisdiction over non-resident is valid only if
non-resident is served with process in forum state); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
727 (1877) (denying personal jurisdiction because there was no in-state service of
process).
In Pennoyer, J.H. Mitchell, an attorney, sued Marcus Neff for uncollected attor-
ney's fees. Id. at 719. Mitchell obtained a default judgment against Neff. Id. at
719-20. Mitchell executed his judgment against Neff by forcing a sheriff's sale of
property that Neff owned. Id. at 719. Years later, Neff sued a subsequent pur-
chaser of the property arguing that the defaultjudgment was invalid. Id. at 719-20.
The Supreme Court agreed with Neff stating that the forum state lacked personal
jurisdiction over Neff. Id. at 734.
15. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727. The Supreme Court stated that a court cannot
exercise a judgment if the court does not have jurisdiction over the party. Id. at
732-33. Exercising the judgment would not constitute due process of law and,
therefore, would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The American people adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Procla-
mation 13, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 Stat., app. at 708 (1868). Only nine years later,
the Supreme Court decided Pennoyer. The Fourteenth Amenldment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[Vol. 40: p. 779
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authority over persons or property without its territory."' 6 Under these
territorial principles, the Court divided personal jurisdiction-into two cate-
gories: in personam and in rem.
7
According to Pennoyer, a court could exert in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant only if the plaintiff served the defendant with process
while in the forum state, or if the defendant voluntarily appeared or con-
sented to jurisdiction. 18 Also, Pennayer stated that a court could exert in
remjurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant had property in the
forum state that the court could seize or attach. 19 In either case, jurisdic-
tion rested upon symbolic assertions of sovereignty.2 0
As interstate commerce developed, Pennoyer's territorial approach to
personal jurisdiction became increasingly difficult to apply.2 1 The ex-
panding American economy became more involved with the interstate
movement of goods and services.22 As a result, state boundaries dimin-
ished in commercial significance. 23 The Pennoyer framework proved ill-
suited for such an economy and, therefore, resulted in some unfair and
absurd results.2 4 The American economy required a more expansive no-
16. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
17. Id. at 724-25. In personamjurisdiction refers to the power that a court has
over the defendant himself in contrast to the court's power over the defendant's
property. BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). A court without personal
jurisdiction is without power to issue an in personamjudgment. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at
732-33. In remjurisdiction refers to a judicial action which is taken against a de-
fendant's property. BLAcK's LAw DicTIONARY 794 (6th ed. 1990).
18. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724-25. The Pennoyer court stated that a lack of in-state
service or a defendant's voluntary appearance was fatal to the plaintiff's action. Id.
at 727. In fact, the parties in Pennoyer did not even argue that in personamjurisdic-
tion existed. Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1280-81 (C.D. Or. 1875) (No.
10,083). Instead, the case centered on the existence of in rem jurisdiction. Pen-
noyer, 95 U.S. at 728.
19. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724-25. In remrjurisdiction existed only if the defend-
ant had property within the forum state and the court took control of the prop-
erty. Id. As a result, creditors could only enforce an in rem judgment against the
property brought within the court's control. Id. In addition, the Pennoyer Court
emphasized that a court must attach property at the commencement of an in rem
action. Id.
20. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. Rv. 19, 23, 35
(1990-91).
21. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917)
(creating legal fiction that foreign corporation doing business in forum state is
present in that state and thus subject to service of process); International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (same).
22. Murphy, supra note 4, at 253.
23. Kenneth F. Ripple & Mollie A. Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson: Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 THE NOTRE DAME LAw. 65, 70 (1980)
(noting that "[a]s communication and commerce became increasingly interstate
in character, state boundaries diminished in commercial importance").
24. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (allowing
jurisdiction where defendant was served with process while flying over forum
1995] CASEBRIEF 783
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tion of personal jurisdiction. 25 The Supreme Court recognized this need
and expanded personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.2
6
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court adhered to Pennoye's territo-
rial framework, but broadly construed the concept of "presence" to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer.2 7 The Court
state); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870) (upholding jurisdiction where
nonresident defendant was served with process on ship in Boston Harbor).
25. Murphy, supra note 4, at 253; see Ripple.& Murphy, supra note 23, at 70
(stating that Pennoyeds framework was ill-suited for economy involved in interstate
movement of commerce). The Pennoyer framework did accommodate some inter-
state interests. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). For example, Pen-
noyer sanctioned quasi-in-renjurisdiction. See id. Quasi-in rem jurisdiction refers to
proceedings that are brought against the defendant personally; however, the de-
fendant's interest in the property serves as the basis for jurisdiction. BLACK'S LAW
DIcIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990). Quasi-in rem jurisdiction affects only a particular
person's interests in specific property and, therefore, is unlike in ren jurisdiction
which determines interests in specific property as against the whole world. Avery v.
Bender, 204 A.2d 314, 317 (Vt. 1964).
Pennoyer also recognized certain exceptions to its territorial precepts. For ex-
ample, a state could require a partnership or an association to consent to forum
jurisdiction as a condition of doing business there. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-36. In
addition, lower courts broadly interpreted Pennoyers "presence" to create a few
exceptions. For example, courts determined that a corporation conducting busi-
ness in a state was "present" in that state and therefore subject to service of process.
See, e.g., McKibbin, 243 U.S. at 264 (creating legal fiction that foreign corporation
doing business in forum state is present in that state and thus subject to service of
process); International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (same). Also, if
an out-of-state motorist used a particular state's highways, the motorist was deemed
to have appointed an official of that state as her agent for accepting process. Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
26. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the State of Washington Office
of Unemployment Compensation and Placement sued the International Shoe
Company to recover unpaid contributions under the state Unemployment Com-
pensation Act. Id. at 311. The International Shoe Company was a Delaware corpo-
ration which had its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Id. at 313.
The International Shoe Company manufactured and sold shoes. Id. The company
had no office in Washington and made no contracts either for the sale or for the
purchase of merchandise there. Id. Nevertheless, International Shoe employed
between 11 and 13 salesmen in Washington. Id. The salesmen were limited to
exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders. Id. at 314. They did not have the
authority to enter into contracts or to make collections. Id. The salesmen trans-
mitted their orders to International Shoe's St. Louis office and the company then
shipped the merchandise to purchasers within Washington. Id.
International Shoe argued that its activities within Washington were not suffi-
cient to manifest its presence there and, therefore, the state courts lacked personal
jurisdiction over the company. Id. at 315. The Supreme Court disagreed and held
that Washington state courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Shoe. Id. at 320-21.
27. Id. at 316, 320. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court recognized that a
court's jurisdiction over a defendant was historically grounded on a court's de
facto power over the defendant's person. Id. As a result, a defendant's presence
within a court's territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to render a judgment
personally binding the defendant. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that due
process only requires that, if a defendant is not present within the forum state, the
[Vol. 40: p. 779
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stated that the terms "present" or "presence" merely symbolize a corpora-
tion's activities within a state which "courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process."28 The Supreme Court required that
a corporate defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum
state, such that maintaining suit would not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."29 The Court stated that "fair play" re-
quires sufficient contacts to make it reasonable to require a corporation to
defend a particular suit.30 The Supreme Court then provided two defini-
tions for "minimum contacts. 3 1 First, the Court held that minimum con-
tacts exist whenever a defendant engages in "systematic and continuous"
activities in the forum state.32 Second, the Court noted that a corpora-
tion's single act or occasional acts could be enough to constitute mini-
defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the law-
suit would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court fit the assertion of jurisdiction into one
of Pennoyer's traditional territorial bases, namely in personam jurisdiction based on
"presence." Id. at 321.
28. Id. at 316-17. International Shoe departed from prior cases in which the
Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations on the notion
of consent. See, e.g., Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373 (1920)
(relying on express consent); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404,
407 (1855) (relying on fictional notion of consent). Instead, International Shoe
based jurisdiction on the equally fictional notion of corporate presence. Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. Nevertheless, the Court argued that this definition
of corporate presence was consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions in which
a corporate defendant's activities had been not only "continuous and systematic"
but had also given rise to the cause of action. Id. at 317; see, e.g., Commercial Mut.
Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 255-56 (1909) (recognizing that foreign corpo-
rations are present within that state if corporation's agents and officers conduct
business in that state); Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197
U.S. 407, 414-15 (1905) (same); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172
U.S. 602, 610-11 (1899) (same); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (same).
29. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)). The Court explained that when a defendant conducts activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of that state's laws. Id. at 319.
Consequently, a state could exert jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising
from the defendant's activities within that state without violating due process. Id.
30. Id. at 317.
31. Id. at 318, 320.
32. Id. at 320. In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court described this
type ofjurisdiction as general jurisdiction. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1952). A court can exercise general jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant if the defendant's contacts are so substantial, systematic and
continuous that it is reasonable to compel the defendant to submit to the forum
state's jurisdiction for all purposes. Id.; see, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (applying general jurisdiction test
first suggested in International Shoe and later developed in Perkins); see also Mary
Twitchell, The Myth of GeneralJurisdiction, "101 HARv. L. REv. 610, 613 (1988) (char-
acterizing general jurisdiction as "dispute-blind" because not based on nature of
controversy); Thomas T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1122-23 (1966) (stating that gen-
eral jurisdiction can be based on unrelated contacts).
7
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mum contacts if the act or acts gave rise to the cause of action. 33
Accordingly, the Court concluded that a state could exercise in personam
jurisdiction if a non-resident defendant has enough minimum contacts
with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '3 4
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court clarified the minimum
contacts test and its relationship to "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. ' 35 First, contacts must demonstrate that the defendant
purposefully conducted activities within the forum state, thereby invoking
the benefits and protection of the forum state's laws.3 6 Second, the plain-
tiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction by demonstrating that the
defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.3 7 Once
the plaintiff has met this burden, the defendant must present a compel-
ling case that other factors render jurisdiction unreasonable. 38 In deter-
mining whether jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the
circumstances, a court may consider the following five factors: (1) the de-
33. International Shoe 326 U.S. at 318. In a subsequent decision, the Supreme
Court described this type ofjurisdiction as specific jurisdiction. Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1950). In 1986, the Fifth Circuit held that
even a single purposeful contact may be sufficient to meet the requirements of
specific jurisdiction when the cause of action arises from the contact. Micromedia
v. Automated Broadcast Controls, 799 F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223). Courts generally use a "totality of
the circumstances" approach to determine whether a defendant's contacts with a
forum state satisfy the requirements of general or specific jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that number of
contacts with forum state is one factor to be considered within "totality of circum-
stances"); Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1029-30
(5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that totality of facts in case did not warrant exercise of
personal jurisdiction).
34. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)). The Court applied this newly formulated test of corporate pres-
ence and concluded that the International Shoe Co. was amenable to jurisdiction.
Id. at 320. The Court concluded that the company satisfied both definitions of
minimum contacts. Id. First, International Shoe's activities in Washington re-
sulted in a large volume of business, and therefore satisfied the "systematic and
continuous" test. Id. Second, International Shoe's activities in Washington gave
rise to the cause of action, and therefore satisfied the "related act" test. Id.
35. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (establishing that mini-
mum contacts analysis must focus on relationship between defendant, forum state
and litigation). A court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
or purposefully directs its activities toward forum residents. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
36. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
37. FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1987);
Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
38. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. In Burger King, the Supreme Court stated
that a plaintiff must not employ jurisdictional rules in such a way as to make litiga-
tion "so gravely difficult and inconvenient" for the defendant that he or she is at a
"severe disadvantage" compared with the plaintiff. Id. at 478 (quoting Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
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fendant's burden of defending the suit in the forum state; (2) the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the controversy; (3) the plaintiff's interest
in convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the state's
interests in furthering social policies.3 9
Because International Shoe and its progeny emphasized purposeful
contacts, these decisions left unclear whether a state could exert personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer whose injury-causing prod-
uct entered the forum state indirectly. 4° In 1961, the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.4 1 In Gray, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer was proper when
the manufacturer's injury-causing product entered the forum state indi-
rectly.4 2 The plaintiff filed a products liability suit alleging that an Ohio
manufacturer's defective valve caused her water heater to explode.43 One
defendant manufactured the allegedly defective valve in Ohio. 44 A second
defendant purchased the valve and installed it in a water heater in Penn-
sylvania.4 5 The defendants' only contact with Illinois was that the plaintiff,
an Illinois consumer, purchased the water heater.46 The Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that it was reasonable for the manufacturers to defend a
39. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307-313 (1981) (considering
state's interest in furthering social policies); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (same); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92
(1978) (considering plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief and inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining efficient resolution of controversies);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (considering
defendant's burden of defending suit in forum state and forum state's interest in
adjudicating controversy).
40. Murphy, supra note 4, at 256 (recognizing that Supreme Court's pur-
poseful contacts requirement threatened state's ability to reach defendants that
did not act directly in forum state).
As the American economy became interstate, manufacturers developed so-
phisticated distribution systems to transport their products indirectly into forum
states. Id. at 255 (discussing advancements in manufacturers' distribution sys-
tems). As a result, some courts became concerned that the Supreme Court's pur-
poseful contacts requirement threatened a forum state's ability to reach these
manufacturers. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni
Agusta, 553 F. Supp. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating that manufacturer should
not be insulated from liability by establishing "indirect and multi-faceted chain of
distribution"); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732, 735-37 (Ariz.
1966) (stating concern about recent Supreme Court decisions extending jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants and their impact on product liability cases).
41. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
42. Id. at 767.
43. Id. at 762.
44. Id. at 764. A summons was served in Cleveland, Ohio on the registered
agent of the Titan Valve Manufacturing Company. Id. at 762.
45. Id. at 764. Defendants American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corpo-
ration were incorporated in Pennsylvania. Id.
46. Id. The court noted that "[Titans'] only contact with [Illinois] is found in
the fact that a product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated in Pennsylvania,
1995]
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suit arising from alleged defects in their products. 47 The court reasoned
that the defendants' products entered the forum state in the "ordinary
course of commerce" which was sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
test of International Shoe.48
Although many lower courts adopted Illinois' stream of commerce
analysis, the United States Supreme Court did not adopt the theory until
1980 when it decided World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson.49 In
World-Wide Volkswagen, New York residents filed a products liability suit in
Oklahoma.5 0 While traveling through Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were in-
volved in an automobile accident and suffered severe injuries.5 1 Alleging
that their injuries resulted from a defective automobile design, the plain-
tiffs sued the automobile's manufacturer and members of the manufac-
turer's distribution network, including its importer, regional distributor
and retail dealer.5 2 The defendants' only contact with the forum state was
into a hot water heater which in the course of commerce was sold to an Illinois
consumer." Id.
47. Id. at 766. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that a defendant's volume
of business is not the only way a non-resident can form the required connection
with a forum state. Id. at 764. The court recognized that jurisdictional require-
ments have been relaxed since International Shoe was decided. Id. The court con-
cluded that "it is sufficient if the act or transaction itself has a substantial
connection" with the forum state. Id. For a further discussion of International Shoe,
see supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 766. As a general proposition, the court stated that if a corporation
decides to sell its products for ultimate use in another state, it is not unreasonable
to hold the corporation answerable in that state for any damage caused by defects
in the corporation's products. Id.
49. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
50. Id. at 288. The plaintiffs were Harry and Kay Robinson and their two chil-
dren. Id. at 288 & n.2. Kay Robinson sued on her own behalf. Id. The two Robin-
son children sued through their father, Harry Robinson. Id.
51. Id. at 288. The Robinsons were New York residents. Id. In 1976, they
purchased a new Audi automobile from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. in New York. Id.
The following year, the Robinsons moved to Arizona. Id. As the Robinsons drove
through Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi. Id. The accident caused a fire
that severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children. Id.
52. Id. The Robinsons alleged that their injuries resulted from a defective
design in the Audi's gas tank and fuel system. Id. The Robinsons filed a products
liability suit in Oklahoma. Id. The Robinsons sued the automobile's manufac-
turer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); the automobile's im-
porter, Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); the automobile's regional
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide Volkswagen); and the au-
tomobile's retail dealer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway). Id. Seaway and World-
Wide Volkswagen entered special appearances and claimed that Oklahoma's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over them violated due process. Id.
788 [Vol. 40: p. 779
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the location of the accident.58 The defendants had sold the automobile in
New York to New York residents. 5 4
The Supreme Court characterized the defendants' contact with the
forum state of Oklahoma as a "fortuitous circumstance."5 5 The Court con-
cluded that the defendants did not serve the Oklahoma market either di-
rectly or indirectly. 56 The Court found a total absence of those "affiliating
circumstances" necessary to exercise jurisdiction.5 7 Although the Court
refused to exercise jurisdiction, the Court cited Gray in concluding that a
forum can assert "personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased" in the forum state. 58
Although the Supreme Court recognized the stream of commerce
theory in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court did not address its application
with respect to international commerce until its decision in Asahi Metal
Industry v. Superior Court.5 9 In Asahi, a California resident filed a products
53. Id. at 287. Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen were both incorporated
and headquartered in New York. Id. at 288-89. Under contract with Volkswagen,
World-Wide Volkswagen distributed vehicles, parts and accessories to retail dealers
in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. Id. at 289. There was no evidence that
either World-Wide Volkswagen or Seaway conducted any business in Oklahoma.
Id. In fact, there was no evidence that any other automobile sold by either World-
Wide Volkswagen or Seaway had ever entered Oklahoma. Id.
54. Id. at 288.
55. Id. at 295. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the foresee-
ability that the car would travel to other states provided a basis for jurisdiction. Id.
at 295-96. The Court stated that the foreseeability which was critical to due pro-
cess was not that the defendant's product might enter the forum state, rather that
the defendant "should [have] reasonably anticipate [d] being haled into court" in
the forum state. Id. at 297. The Court justified its holding regarding the Due
Process Clause because potential defendants should be allowed to structure their
conduct to avoid out-of-state litigation. Id.
56. Id. at 295. The defendants did not carry on any activities within
Oklahoma. Id. They did not solicit any business in Oklahoma either through sales
people or through advertisements reasonably calculated to reach Oklahoma. Id.
They did not close any sales or perform any services there. Id. They did not regu-
larly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers. Id. They did not serve
or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. Id. In fact, they availed "themselves of
none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law." Id.
57. Id. at 299. The Court explained that the concept of minimum contacts
serves two related but distinguishable functions. Id. at 291-92. First, minimum
contacts protects defendants from litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. Id.
at 292. Second, minimum contacts ensures that state courts do not reach beyond
.the limits placed on them by "their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem." Id.
58. Id. at 297-98 (citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)). The Supreme Court cited Gray with a "Cf" signal, which
means "compare." Id. As a result, one commentator suggested that it is not clear
whether Gray was cited with approval. Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Pro-
cess Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 94 n.78.
59. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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liability suit in California against a Taiwanese manufacturer. 60 The
Taiwanese manufacturer sought indemnification from a Japanese manu-
facturer, which made component parts for the Taiwanese manufacturer. 61
Although the California resident settled with the Taiwanese manufacturer,
the Taiwanese manufacturer maintained the indemnity action in the Cali-
fornia courts.6 2 Because the Japanese manufacturer had no contacts with
California, the Japanese manufacturer argued that California could not
exert personal jurisdiction without violating due process.63 The California
Supreme Court disagreed and used the stream of commerce theory to ex-
ert personal jurisdiction over the Japanese manufacturer. 64 The United
States Supreme Court unanimously reversed and refused to exercise
jurisdiction.65
Although a unanimous Supreme Court refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion, the Justices issued three sharply divided opinions.66 Writing for the
60. Id. at 105-06. In Asahi, Gary Zucker, the original plaintiff, lost control of
his Honda motorcycle and collided with a tractor. Id. at 105. The accident se-
verely injured Zucker and killed Zucker's wife. Id. Zucker alleged that an explo-
sion in the motorcycle's rear tire caused the accident. Id. at 106. Zucker also
alleged that there were defects in the motorcycle tire, tube and sealant. Id. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff sued Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co. (Cheng Shin), the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube. Id.
61. Id. at 106. Cheng Shin sought indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry
Co. (Asahi). Id. Asahi is a Japanese corporation that manufactures tire valve as-
semblies in Japan and then sells the assemblies to several tire manufacturers, in-
cluding Cheng Shin. Id.
62. Id. at 106. The plaintiff eventually settled his claims against Cheng Shin
and the other defendants. Id. Nevertheless, Cheng Shin's indemnity action
against Asahi was still pending. Id.
63. Id. Asahi manufactured the tire valve assemblies in Japan. Id. Asahi sold
the tire valve assemblies to Cheng Shin in Taiwan. Id. Asahi sent shipments of tire
valve assemblies from Japan to Cheng Shin in Taiwan. Id. In an affidavit, the Pres-
ident of Asahi declared that Asahi never contemplated that its sales of tire valves to
a manufacturer in Taiwan would subject Asahi to litigation in California. Id. at 107
(citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 549-50 n.4 (1985), rev'd,
480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
64. Id. at 108. The California Supreme Court concluded that Asahi knew that
Cheng Shin sold tire tubes in California that contained Asahi's valve assemblies.
Id. Therefore, Asahi benefitted indirectly from Cheng Shin's sales in California.
Id. The California Supreme Court reasoned that California's exercise of personal
jurisdiction satisfied the Due Process Clause for two reasons. Id. First, Asahi inten-
tionally placed its products into the stream of commerce. Id. Second, Asahi knew
that some of its products would eventually reach California. Id.
65. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that minimum contacts had not been estab-
lished and that California's exercise of personal jurisdiction was inconsistent "with
fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 116.
66. Id. at 105, 108. Although Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the
Court, her minimum contacts analysis did not command a majority. Id. at 105,
108-13, 116 (presentingJustice O'Connor's opinion with regard to minimum con-
tacts and noting which Justices joined her analysis). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Jus-
tice Powell and Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor's analysis. Id. at 105.
Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun supported Justice Brennan's analysis. Id. at
116 (Brennan, J., concurring). Finally, Justices White and Blackmun also joined
Justice Stevens' opinion. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a further discus-
[Vol. 40: p. 779
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Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that the mere act of placing a product
in the stream of commerce does not constitute minimum contacts even if
the defendant is aware that the stream of commerce will sweep its product
into the forum state.6 7 According to Justice O'Connor, a state can exer-
cise personal jurisdiction only if the defendant purposefully directs its ac-
tivities toward the forum state.68 Therefore, Justice O'Connor's approach
requires manufacturers to engage in purposeful conduct beyond placing
its product into the stream of commerce. 69 Justice O'Connor provided
examples of such additional conduct, including advertising in the forum
state, designing the product for the forum state's market, providing cus-
tomer support in the forum state and marketing the product through a
distributor in the forum state. 70
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor's
approach but concluded that she misapplied it to the facts of the case. 7 1
Justice Stevens argued that an unwavering line cannot be drawn between
mere awareness that a component will enter a forum state and purposeful
sion of Justice O'Connor's minimum contacts analysis, see infra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion ofJustice Steven's minimum contacts
analysis, see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
Justice Brennan's minimum contacts analysis, see infra notes 74-77 and accompa-
nying text.
67. Id. at 112.
68. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) and
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Justice O'Connor
stated that the mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without
more, is not an act purposefully directed at the forum state. Id. Justice O'Connor
noted that a defendant's purpose or intent to serve a forum state's market can only
be indicated by additional conduct. Id. '
69. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that the defendant's awareness that the prod-
uct will reach the forum state does not convert the act of placing a product into
the stream of commerce into an act "purposefully directed" toward the forum
state. Id.
70. Id. Applying this analysis to defendant Asahi,Justice O'Connor noted the
following facts: Asahi did not conduct business in California; Asahi did not adver-
tise or solicit business in California; Asahi did not create, control or employ the
distribution system that swept Asahi's products into California; and Asahi did not
desigh the valve assembles in anticipation of sales in California. Id. at 112-13. Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that, although Asahi may have been aware that some of its
valve assemblies would be component parts of tire tubes sold in California, there
was no evidence that Asahi had "purposefully avail [ed] itself of the California mar-
ket." Id. at 112. Therefore,Justice O'Connor concluded that exerting jurisdiction
over Asahi would violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 113.
71. Id. at 121-22 (Stevens,J, concurring). Justice Stevens also noted that reso-
lution of the stream of commerce issue was unnecessary. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Because eight Justices concluded that California's exercise of juris-
diction would be "unreasonable and unfair," Justice Stevens argued that a mini-
mum contacts analysis was not necessary. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens stated that this case demonstrated that " 'fair play and substantial justice'
may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purpose-
fully engaged in forum activities." Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
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availment of the forum state's market. 72 Justice Stevens formulated a test
that examines the volume, value and hazardous character of the
components. 7
3
In the third opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice
O'Connor and stated that the additional manufacturer conduct require-
ment was unnecessary.7 4 Justice Brennan concluded that a defendant's
awareness that "the final product is being marketed in the forum Is] tate"
is enough to make personal jurisdiction reasonable. 75 In such cases, the
defendant is benefitting economically from the retail sales in the forum
market, and is benefitting indirectly from the forum state's legislation reg-
ulating intrastate commerce. 76 Because the defendant is indirectly en-
joying the forum state's protection, Justice Brennan concluded that a
forum state's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant satisfies due
process. 77
Although the Justices could not agree on a minimum contacts analy-
sis, eightJustices agreed that exercising personal jurisdiction over theJap-
72. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens suggested that a regular
course of dealing that involved deliveries of 100,000 units annually would consti-
tute purposeful availment and would satisfy due process. Id. (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens also suggested that he believed such a course of dealing
would constitute purposeful availment even if the product delivered was a standard
product marketed world-wide. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan disagreed with
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the stream of commerce theory and with the
conclusion that Asahi did not purposefully avail itself of the forum market. Id.
(Brennan, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Brennan rejected the additional
conduct requirement because it was a "marked retreat" from World-Wide Volk-
swagen. Id. at 118 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued that World-
Wide Volkswagen only requires that a defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into the fo-
rum state's court. Id. at 119 (Brennan,J., concurring). Relying on World-Wide Volk-
swagen, Justice Brennan stated that a forum state can exercise jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expec-
tation that consumers will purchase them in the forum state. Id. at 119-20 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also noted that
World-Wide Volkswagen approvingly cited Gray. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Because Gray was "a well known stream-of-commerce case," Justice Brennan inter-
preted World-Wide Volkswagen as preserving the stream of commerce theory. Id.
(Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that these
benefits accrue regardless of whether the defendant directly conducts business in
the forum state or engages in additional conduct directed toward the forum state.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. (Brennan,J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that most courts and
commentators have concluded that jurisdiction can be based on placing a product
into the stream of commerce without any additional conduct. Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan did note, however, that he concurred with the
court's conclusion that an exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi would not be fair or
in the interest of justice. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
792
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anese manufacturer would be "unreasonable and unfair."7 8 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court considered "the international context, the
heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plain-
tiff and the forum [s]tate."79 Because no single opinion commanded a
majority, the minimum contacts analysis of the stream of commerce theory
is presently unresolved. Until the Supreme Court addresses the issue
again, lower courts must decipher which of the three Asahi opinions con-
stitutes the appropriate analysis.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS: DIVIDED OVER THE PROPER APPROACH TO
STREAM OF COMMERCE CASES
As a result of the Asahi decision, the current law regarding personal
jurisdiction is unsettled.8 0 Three approaches for applying the "stream of
commerce" analysis have emerged in the circuit courts.8 1 First, a majority
of the circuit courts have avoided determining which minimum contacts
analysis applies.82 The Federal, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
78. Id. at 116. The eightJustices who agreed that exercising personal jurisdic-
tion would not be fair were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Brennan, Justice
White, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, Justice Stevens and Jus-
tice O'Connor. Id. at 105. Only Justice Scalia did not join Justice O'Connor's
opinion which held that exercising personal jurisdiction over the Japanese manu-
facturer would be "unreasonable and unfair." Id. at 116. Justice Scalia denied
jurisdiction because Asahi did not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Id.
Although Justice Scalia did not write a separate opinion, it appears that he consid-
ered a fairness and reasonable analysis as unnecessary.
79. Id. at 116. Justice O'Connor stated that the burden on Asahi would be
severe. Id. at 114. Justice O'Connor noted the distance between Asahi's headquar-
ters in Japan and the forum state, California. Id. Justice O'Connor also noted the
"unique burdens" associated with litigation in a foreign legal system. Id. Because
neither party involved in the litigation was a California resident, Justice O'Connor
stressed that the forum state's interest in the dispute was minimal. Id.
80. Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (1lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2334 (1993) (noting "unsettled" state of law concerning personal
jurisdiction). Vermeulen discussed how the Supreme Court has "grappled" with the
stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction and the Court's decisions in
World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi. Id. at 1546-48. For a further discussion of World-
Wide Volkswagen, see supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text. For a further dis-
cussion of Asahi, see supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
81. For a further discussion of the three circuit court approaches for applying
the stream of commerce analysis, see infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
82. Compare Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277, 282-84 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that, although there is no clear final word on stream of commerce theory,
defendant must demonstrate some purposeful availment of forum state and that
additional discovery was needed to determine whether "there was the kind of pur-
poseful availment that would show minimum contacts"); Beverly Hills Fan Co. v.
Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 & n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (avoiding
stream of commerce debate by concluding that jurisdictional requirements were
met under either Justice O'Connor's Asahi test or Justice Brennan's Asahi test);
Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 542-45 (6th Cir.) (dis-
cussing Asahi and concluding jurisdiction was reasonable "even under" Asahi's plu-
rality opinion), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A.,
Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546-48 (11th Cir.) (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen and
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affirmed lower courts' decisions exercising jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants according to all three minimum contacts analyses. 83 There-
fore, these circuit courts have not determined which minimum contacts
analysis to apply in stream of commerce cases.
Second, the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have followed the orig-
inal "stream of commerce" theory advocated by the Supreme Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen.84 The Seventh Circuit justified this approach in
Asahi and noting uncertain state of law concerning personal jurisdiction), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2334 (1993); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381-82 &
n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting Ninth Circuit's three part test to determine whether
jurisdiction satisfies due process and that court need not reach question of
whether knowledge of sales is sufficient, as Justice Brennan's test suggests, because
defendant met three of four types of conduct mentioned by Justice O'Connor),
rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) with Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Dis-
play Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 612-15 (8th Cir.) (noting additional conduct other
than distribution as not necessary to establish jurisdiction and distinguishing
Asahi), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 359 (1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson
Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting Fifth Circuit's rejection of Justice
O'Connor's stream of commerce theory and following original stream of com-
merce theory developed in World-Wide Volkswagen); Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc.,
967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that circuits facing stream of com-
merce questions directly have adopted Justice O'Connor's Asahi view that aware-
ness that product may reach forum state is not same as purposeful availment);
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that
Supreme Court established stream of commerce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen
and that majority had not yet rejected it).
For a further discussion of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, see supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Justice Steven's
opinion in Asahi, see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. For a further dis-
cussion ofJustice Brennan's opinion in Asahi, see supra notes 74-77 and accompa-
nying text. For a further discussion of Asahi, see supra notes 59-79 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen, see supra
notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
83. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed.
Cir.) (finding that "under either stream of commerce theories, plaintiff made re-
quired jurisdictional showing"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 18 (1994); Tobin v. Astra
Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 542-45 (6th Cir.) (concluding jurisdic-
tion was reasonable "even under" Asahi's plurality opinion), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
304 (1993); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548-50 (11th Cir.)
(concluding that jurisdiction is consistent with Justice O'Connor's more stringent
stream of commerce analysis and therefore refusing to determine which analysis
actually controls case), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2334 (1993); Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (avoiding issue whether Justice Bren-
nan's test, in itself, supported jurisdiction because plaintiff satisfied Justice
O'Connor's additional conduct requirements), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585
(1991).
84. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th
Cir.) (refusing to follow Asahi and noting that apparently five AsahiJustices fol-
lowed reasoning in World-Wide Volkswagen), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 359 (1994); Rus-
ton Gas Turbines v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that
Fifth Circuit has "continued to follow the original 'stream-of-commerce' theory"
set forth by majority in World-Wide Volkswagen and has rejected Justice O'Connor's
"stream-of-commerce-plus" theory); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941,
947 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that Supreme Court established stream of commerce
theory and majority had not yet rejected it). See, e.g., Ham v. La Cienega Music,
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Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks.85 In Dehmlow, the Seventh Circuit stated that
the Supreme Court had established the stream of commerce theory in
World-Wide Volkswagen and a majority of the Court had failed to reject that
theory in Asahi.8 6 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit argued that it could not
depart from the Court's holding in World-Wide Volkswagen based on a belief
that the current Supreme Court Justices would not readily agree with past
Court decisions. 87
The Eighth Circuit also advocated the original stream of commerce
theory, but offered a different rationale.8 8 The Eighth Circuit concluded
that Asahi stood only for the proposition that it is unreasonable to adjudi-
cate between two foreign companies absent the non-resident defendant's
consent.89 The Eighth Circuit noted that five Justices in Asahi agreed that
a continuous and significant placement of products into the stream of
commerce, with knowledge that the products will be distributed into the
forum state, establishes minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due pro-
cess. 90 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit argued that the Asahi Court followed
World-Wide Volkswagen's holding that when a manufacturer serves a market
either directly or indirectly, "it is not unreasonable to subject the manufac-
turer to suit" in the forum state if the manufacturer's defective product
caused injury to the plaintiff in the forum state. 91
Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that defendant meets minimum
contacts standard where defendant's purposeful conduct directed at forum state
allows benefit of state's laws and where defendant could anticipate litigation in
forum state); Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas, Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 386 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 (1989) (noting that Asahi provides no "clear gui-
dance" and that Fifth Circuit continues to follow World-Wide Volkswagen).
85. 963 F.2d 941, 946-47 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing evolution of stream of
commerce theory and noting why Seventh Circuit considers original stream of
commerce theory "determinative").
86. Id. (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen, subsequent cases in Seventh Circuit
and Asahi). The Seventh Circuit noted that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court estab-
lished the stream of commerce theory, and a majority of the Court has not yet
rejected it, we consider that theory to be determinative." Id. at 947. The Seventh
Circuit noted that while "this case is being decided on the basis of the more per-
missive stream of commerce theory," the defendant in Dehmlow demonstrated addi-
tional contacts with the forum state, therefore satisfyingJustice O'Connor's stricter
minimum contacts analysis in Asahi. Id. at 947-48.
87. Id. at 947 (noting that "[w]e may not depart from Court precedent on the
basis of a belief" that currentJustices would not agree with decisions of their pred-
ecessors); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S.
477, 484-86 (1989) (noting that if Supreme Court precedent directly applies to
case but Court's decision seems to be based on reasons rejected in another line of
cases, lower court should follow decision that directly controls case and leave
Supreme Court to overrule its prior decisions).
88. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 612-15
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 359 (1994).
89. Id. at 614.
90. Id. The court in Barone noted that they were "loath" to count votes from a
decision in which the Supreme Court was divided. Id. at 614.
91. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
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Third, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted Justice
O'Connor's minimum contacts analysis.92 In Boit v. Gar-Tec Products,93 the
First Circuit held that mere awareness that a product may end up in the
forum state does not constitute purposeful availment.9 4 In support of this
holding, the First Circuit noted that circuits which have squarely ad-
dressed the stream of commerce issue after Asahi have also adopted Justice
O'Connor's minimum contacts analysis. 95
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO STREAM OF COMMERCE CASES
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit did not adopt the
stream of commerce analysis until the 1980s.96 Presently, the Third Cir-
cuit has decided only three stream of commerce cases.97
The Third Circuit first addressed the stream of commerce issue in
DeJames v. Magnificence Cariers.98 In DeJames, a New Jersey longshoreman
suffered an injury while working on an automobile carrier vessel docked in
NewJersey. 99 Dejames, the longshoreman, filed a products liability suit in
New Jersey against the vessel's charterer and the vessel's converter,
Hitachi. 100 Hitachi was ajapanese corporation which converted the vessel
in Japan from a bulk carrier to an automobile carrier.10 1 Dejames alleged
that Hitachi negligently converted the vessel. 10 2 The location of Hitachi's
92. Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992). This
approach has been described as the most stringent and has been referred to as the
"stream of commerce plus." SeeVermeulen v. Renault, U.SA., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534,
1548 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce plus"
theory).
93. 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992).
94. Id. at 683.
95. Id. The First Circuit cited the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits as adopting
Justice O'Connor's analysis. Id. In subsequent decisions, however, both circuits
have altered their positions. For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's posi-
tion, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
Eighth Circuit's position, see supra notes 82, 84, 88-91 and accompanying text.
96. See Renner v. Lanard Toys, 33 F.3d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 1994) (reaffirming
viability of stream of commerce theory); Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654
F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir.) (characterizing stream of commerce as means for sus-
taining jurisdiction over non-resident manufacturers in product liability cases),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
97. Renner v. Lanard Toys, 33 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1994); Max Daetwyler Corp.
v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
For a discussion of these three cases, see infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
98. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
99. Id. at 282. The vessel, the M.V. Magnificence Venture, was moored to a
pier in Camden, New Jersey. Id.
100. Id. at 282-83. DeJames filed the products liability suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id. at 282. DeJames alleged
negligence and strict liability in tort. Id.
101. Id. at 282-83. In addition to being a Japanese corporation, Hitachi also
maintained its principal place of business in Japan. Id.
102. Id.
796 [Vol. 40: p. 779
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vessel at the time of Dejames' injury cbnstituted Hitachi's sole contact with
New Jersey.103 Dejames argued that New Jersey could exercise personal
jurisdiction over Hitachi based on the stream of commerce analysis.10 4
Hitachi filed a motion to dismiss the products liability suit for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.10 5
Relying on International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen, the Third Cir-
cuit granted Hitachi's motion and declined to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion. 10 6 Although the Third Circuit approved the stream of commerce
analysis as a valid basis for exercising personal jurisdiction, the Third Cir-
cuit held that a customer's unilateral action of bringing a manufacturer's
product into a forum state does not establish minimum contacts with that
forum state.10 7 In dicta, the Third Circuit suggested that exercising juris-
diction over non-resident manufacturers may not be unreasonable if the
manufacturers indirectly place their products into the stream of com-
merce through importers with independent sales and marketing
schemes.1 08 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit did not address whether a
103. Id. at 284. Hitachi stated that further contact with the vessel ceased after
it leftJapan. Id. at 283. In addition, Hitachi did not maintain an office, have an
agent or transact any business in New Jersey. Id.
104. Id. at 285. DeJames argued that Hitachi's conversion work on the vessel
made Hitachi the vessel's manufacturer. Id. Dejames, therefore, contended that
this fact distinguished his lawsuit from World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. But see World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980) (stating that defendants
included local retailer, regional distributor and car manufacturer). Dejames as-
serted that courts may exercise jurisdiction over Hitachi when Hitachi's ships dock
in the jurisdiction and an injury results from Hitachi's negligent work. Defames,
654 F.2d at 285.
105. Id. at 283. Hitachi filed a motion to dismiss according to Rule 12(b) (2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Hitachi also argued that there was
insufficient service of process. Id. at 282. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
served Hitachi with process at Hitachi's place of business in Japan. Id. at 283. Ap-
parently, this service of process was in accordance with an international treaty. Id.
106. Id. at 285-86. The Third Circuit recognized that a single contact be-
tween a defendant and a forum state may be the basis forjurisdiction if the lawsuit
arose from the contact. Id. at 286. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit focused on
whether the defendant should have anticipated being haled before the forum
state's courts based on its conduct. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that Hitachi's
conduct did not satisfy this requirement. Id.
107. Id. at 285-86. The Third Circuit rejected the argument that Hitachi
should have foreseen that the vessel could have transported cars anywhere in the
world, and therefore, Hitachi should have anticipated litigation in New Jersey. Id.
at 286. The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
rejected the argument that foreseeability alone will support personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause. Id.
108. Id. at 285. The Third Circuit stated that jurisdiction in such cases is con-
sistent with due process because "by increasing the distribution of its products
through indirect sales within the forum, a manufacturer benefits legally from the
protection provided by the laws of the forum state for its products, as well as eco-
nomically from indirect sales to forum residents." Id.
1995]
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manufacturer's knowledge of product sales in a forum state will alone es-
tablish personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce analysis. 10 9
The Third Circuit addressed another expansive application of the
stream of commerce analysis in Max Daetwyler Corp. v. K Meyer.1 10 In Max
Daetuyler, a New York corporation commenced a patent infringement suit
in a Pennsylvania federal court against a West German businessman."'
The West German businessman manufactured printing products in Ger-
many and independent distributors sold these products in the United
States.112 One distributor sold these printing products to three customers
in Pennsylvania. 313
The plaintiff, a New York Corporation, argued that the Third Circuit
should not confine the stream of commerce analysis only to Pennsylvania
because patent infringement arises under federal law. 1 4 Max Daetwyler
argued that personal jurisdiction should be based on the non-resident de-
fendant's aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole - a "na-
tional contacts" theory." 5 Max Daetwyler contended that the non-
resident defendant participated in a distribution system aimed at major
industrial markets, which reasonably included Pennsylvania. a1 6 Relying
on World-Wide Volkswagen, the Third Circuit rejected a "national contacts"
theory as a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction.' 7 The Third Circuit
reiterated World-Wide Volkswagen's pronouncement that the mere likeli-
109. Renner v. Lanard Toys, 33 F.3d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Dejames,
654 F.2d at 285).
110. 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
111. Id. at 291. The Max Daetwyler Corporation manufactures and sells doc-
tor blades, a device used to remove excess ink from the printing surfaces of a
rotogravure printing form. Id. Max Daetwyler filed this patent infringement suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id.
112. Id. at 291-92. Rolf Meyer, the West German businessman, is a sole pro-
prietor who sells doctor blades. Id. at 291. Two distributors, Henry P. Korn Associ-
ates and the Uddeholm Corporation, sold Meyer's blades in the United States. Id.
at 291-92. Uddeholm, a Delaware corporation, takes title to Meyer's blades in West
Germany but warehouses the blades in Cleveland, Ohio. Id. at 292.
113. Id. at 298. Uddeholm sold Meyer's blades to three customers in Penn-
sylvania. Id. In addition, Uddeholm advertised Meyer's blades in several trade
publications. Id. Henry P. Korn Associates, however, never sold Meyer's blades in
Pennsylvania. Id.
114. Id. at 293.
115. Id. Under a "national contacts" theory, a court must determine personaljurisdiction based on the totality of the defendant's contacts throughout the
United States. Id. This theory relies on the notion that "it is not the territory in
which a court sits that determines the extent of its jurisdiction, but rather the geo-
graphical limits of the unit of government of which the court is a part." Cry-
omedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Conn. 1975).
116. Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 298. In dicta, the Third Circuit stated that
even if the court accepted Daetwyler's national contacts theory, the quality and
quantity of Meyer's contacts must still satisfy the constitutional requirements of
International Shoe and its progeny. Id. at 294-95.
117. Id. at 298 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980)).
[Vol. 40: p. 779
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hood that a manufacturer's product will enter a forum state does not pro-
duce a constitutionally sufficient contact.' 1 8
After the Supreme Court's Asahi decision, the Third Circuit re-ex-
amined the stream of commerce analysis in Renner v. Lanard Toys.' 1 9 In
Renner, a toy plane exploded injuring the plaintiff.12 0 DavidJ. Renner, the
plaintiff, filed a products liability action in Pennsylvania against Lanard
Toys, the toy plane's manufacturer.12 1 Lanard, a Hong Kong corporation
with a New York office, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction.' 2 2 Lanard argued that the corporation: (1) did not manufacture
toys in Pennsylvania; (2) owned no real property in Pennsylvania; (3) had
no employees, offices or bank accounts in Pennsylvania; and (4) lacked
control over its distributors. 123 The Renners contended that jurisdiction
would be reasonable because Lanard placed the toy into the stream of
commerce, which brought the toy into Pennsylvania. 124
The Third Circuit recognized the confusion stemming from the
Supreme Court's decision in Asahi.12 5 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit
stated that certain guidelines have emerged.' 2 6 First, the Third Circuit
noted that the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the forum state
for that state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.12 7 Sec-
118. Id. at 298 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286); see World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (noting that manufacturer must attempt to market
products to satisfy minimum contacts jurisdiction test). The Third Circuit inter-
preted World-Wide Volkswagen as suggesting that a non-resident manufacturer need
not transact business in the forum state for that state to exercise jurisdiction if the
manufacturer attempted to cultivate the forum state's market. Max Daetwyler, 762
F.2d at 298 n.11 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286).
119. 33 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1994).
120. Id. at 278. The toy plane contained a cylinder with a propeller. Id. The
toy plane flew from a hand-held launching pad. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the
toy plane exploded, lodging plastic fragments in his left eye and face. Id.
121. Id. David J. Renner and his wife filed suit in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Erie County. Id. Lanard then removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania. Id.
122. Id. The Renners purchased the toy at a McCrory's store in Pennsylvania.
Id. Trade Power Associates Limited, a buying agent, purchased the toy from
Lanard in Hong Kong and supplied it to McCrory's in Erie. Id.
123. Id. In response, the Renners produced two test reports which analyzed
whether the toy plane met McCrory's safety standards. Id. at 278-79. A Hong Kong
laboratory conducted the tests and directed the results to Lanard Toys. Id. at 279.
124. Id. at 279. Appellants advocated an expansive stream of commerce anal-
ysis. Id. They argued that courts may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a manufacturer who places a product into the stream of commerce with
an expectation that such product will be sold in the forum state. Id.
125. Id. at 282 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987)). The Third Circuit summarized the three opinions in Asahi and con-
cluded that the 4-4-1 vote made the stream of commerce analysis difficult to apply.
Id. at 281-82 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102).
126. Id. at 282 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102).
127. Id. The Third Circuit stated that this proposition coincides with Justice
Brennan's analysis in Asahi. Id. (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., concur-
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ond, the Third Circuit indicated that an absence of direct sales or ship-
ments into the forum state does not automatically end the personal
jurisdiction inquiry.1 28 The Third Circuit attempted to apply these guide-
lines to Renner but concluded that the factual record was incomplete.1 29
Therefore, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court. 130
By remanding, the Third Circuit avoided deciding which minimum con-
tacts analysis governs the Third Circuit.
V. ADVICE TO PRACTIrrIONERS
The Third Circuit has decided three stream of commerce cases.13 1 In
each case, the Third Circuit declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the non-resident defendant.'3 2 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has af-
firmed the validity of the stream of commerce analysis in products liability
cases. 133
In stream of commerce cases, the critical issue involves which mini-
mum contacts analysis applies.1 34 In Asahi, Justice O'Connor cited the
Third Circuit's opinion in Max Daetwyler to develop her minimum contacts
analysis.13 5 In his Asahi concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that the
Third Circuit cases contradictJustice O'Connor's analysis. 136 Justice Bren-
ring)). The Third Circuit characterized Justice Brennan's analysis as requiring
more than mere awareness that one's products will enter the forum state. Id. (cit-
ing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Third Circuit con-
cluded that Justice Brennan's Asahi opinion required purposeful, rather than
incidental, contacts. Id. (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
128. Id. The Third Circuit conceded, however, that the presence of direct
shipments does show a defendant's purposeful availment. Id.
129. Id. at 283. The Third Circuit stated that if Lanard tested its product to
meet McCrory's standards, then Lanard satisfied one of Justice O'Connor's addi-
tional conduct examples. Id. (citing Asah4 480 U.S. at 102). Nevertheless, the
record did not indicate that Lanard ordered the test. Id. The record only indi-
cated that Lanard received a copy of the test results. Id.
130. Id. at 284.
131. Renner, 33 F.3d at 277; Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654
F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). For a discussion of these
three cases, see supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
132. For a list of these three cases, see supra note 131. For a discussion of
these three cases, see supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
133. Renner, 33 F.3d at 280; DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). For a detailed discussion of Renner, see
supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of Dejames,
see supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
134. For a list of the relevant Third Circuit cases, see supra note 131. For a
detailed discussion of these cases, see supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
135. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (cit-
ing Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 293-95; DeJames, 654 F.2d at 283). For a detailed
discussion of Asahi, see supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
136. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 118 n.2 (1987) (citing Max Daetuyler, 762 F.2d at 298;
DeJames, 654 F.2d at 285). For a detailed discussion of Asahi, see supra notes 59-79
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40: p. 779
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/11
CASEBRIEF
nan characterized the Third Circuit's holdings as rejecting the stream of
commerce analysis when the defendant could not anticipate the use of its
product in the forum state and when the defendant neither sold nor indi-
rectly marketed its products in the forum state.' 3 7 The Third Circuit in
Renner did not address Justice Brennan's characterization of Third Circuit
precedent. 138 The Third Circuit's failure to determine which minimum
contacts analysis should apply is consistent with the approach taken by the
majority of the circuit courts.' 3 9 The majority of the circuit courts have
avoided advocating one particular minimum contacts analysis.140
Without clear direction from the Third Circuit, practitioners should
emphasize the two guidelines set forth in Renner. (1) the defendant must
purposefully avail itself of the forum state for the state to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) an absence of direct sales or ship-
ments into the forum state does not automatically end the personal juris-
diction inquiry.14 1 In addition, practitioners should cautiously interpret
the Supreme Court's holding in Asahi regarding unreasonable jurisdic-
tion.142 Asahi was a unique case in which both parties were foreign corpo-
rations with no connections to the forum state. 143 Renner differed from
Asahi because Renner involved only one foreign party which may explain
why the Third Circuit in Renner did not even address whether jurisdiction
would be unreasonable.14 4 Therefore, an unreasonable jurisdiction argu-
ment might not succeed in the Third Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the stream of commerce analysis has existed for over thirty
years, the doctrine remains an emerging legal concept within the Third
Circuit. 145 The stream of commerce analysis allows a forum state to exer-
137. Id. (citing Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 290; Dejames, 654 F.2d at 280).
138. Renner v. Lanard Toys, 33 F.3d 277, 277 (3d Cir. 1994).
139. For a discussion of the circuits' approaches to this issue, see supra notes
81-95 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of the approach that the majority of circuit courts have
taken on this issue, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
141. Renner, 33 F.3d at 282. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's
guidelines for applying the stream of commerce analysis, see supra notes 126-28
and accompanying text.
142. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (concluding that exercising personal jurisdic-
tion would be "unreasonable and unfair"). For a further discussion of the
Supreme Court's holding in Asahi regarding unreasonable jurisdiction, see supra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 105-06. For a further discussion of the facts involved in Asahi, see
supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
144. See Renner, 33 F.3d at 278 (remanding case for further discovery to deter-
mine whether court had jurisdiction). For a further discussion of the Third Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Renner, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
145. See Renner, 33 F.3d at 277 (avoiding stream of commerce issue by re-
manding case for further discovery to determine whether court had jurisdiction);
Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.) (approving stream of
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cise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.' 46 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have limited the doctrine's
reach without clearly specifying the restrictions.' 47 The Third Circuit
does not generally exercise personal jurisdiction over every non-resident
manufacturer involved in a products liability action.148 Instead, the Third
Circuit and other courts decide each stream of commerce case based on
the particular facts of that case. 149 This is especially true ever since the
Supreme Court decided Asahi.150 Therefore, a stream of commerce case
inherently requires a factual analysis to either distinguish or adapt existing
legal precedent.
Martin F Noonan
commerce as valid basis for exercising personal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1985); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.) (characteriz-
ing stream of commerce as means for sustaining jurisdiction over non-resident
manufacturers in product liability cases), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). For a
discussion of these three cases, see supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
146. For a further discussion of the stream of commerce analysis as a basis for
exercising personal jurisdiction, see supra notes 41-144 and accompanying text.
147. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102 (issuing three sharply divided opinions describ-
ing appropriate analysis for stream of commerce cases); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (applying stream of commerce analysis to national
franchisor headquartered in Florida suing Michigan-based franchisee in Florida
federal district court); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(citing stream of commerce as basis for exercising personal jurisdiction); Renner,
33 F.3d at 277 (avoiding stream of commerce issue by remanding case for further
discovery to determine whether court had jurisdiction); Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at
290 (approving stream of commerce as valid basis for exercising personal jurisdic-
tion); DeJames, 654 F.2d at 280 (characterizing stream of commerce as means for
sustaining jurisdiction over non-resident manufacturers in product liability cases).
148. See Renner; 33 F.3d at 282-84 (noting that, although there is no clear final
word on stream of commerce theory, defendant must demonstrate some pur-
poseful availment of forum state); Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 298 (refusing to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction on expansive interpretation of stream of commerce
analysis); Defames, 654 F.2d at 285 (characterizing stream of commerce as means
for sustaining jurisdiction over non-resident manufacturers in product liability
cases).
149. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (avoiding stream of commerce debate by exercisingjurisdic-
tion under all three Asahi tests); Renner, 33 F.3d at 277 (avoiding stream of com-
merce issue by remanding case for further discovery to determine whether court
had jurisdiction); Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 993 F.2d 528, 543 (6th
Cir.) (stating that facts supported personal jurisdiction even under purposeful
availment test), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.SA.,
Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993) (avoiding application of stream of com-
merce test by holding higher standard was met); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines,
897 F.2d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585
(1991).
150. For a discussion of how the circuit courts have applied the Supreme
Court's Asahi decision to stream of commerce cases, see supra notes 80-130 and
accompanying text.
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